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I. INTRODUCTION
In a 5-4 opinion with multiple dissents, the Supreme Court struck
down a federal law that increased the campaign contribution limits
applicable to a Congressional candidate whose opponent exceeded a
threshold amount of personal expenditures.1 Congress passed the law
as part of a congressional effort to limit the influence of campaign
2
contributions on national elections. According to the majority, the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), or the
“Millionaire’s Amendment,” violated the First Amendment because it
operated as a significant burden on the ability of candidates to selffinance their own campaigns.3 Moreover, the BCRA did not serve any
compelling state interest that would justify the imposition of such a
4
burden on a candidate’s ability to finance his own political speech.
The Court’s decision reversed a District Court ruling that had upheld
the constitutionality of the law on the grounds that the BCRA did not
operate as a burden on the ability of a self-financed candidate to fund
his campaign because it merely allowed his opponent to increase his
political speech through greater contribution limits.5 The ruling in
Davis was largely based on Buckley v. Valeo, a Supreme Court
decision handed down thirty-two years earlier that held that limits on
personal expenditures were subject to more scrutiny than
6
contribution limits.
*
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One of the Supreme Court’s central conclusions in Davis was that
the only compelling state interests that can justify “a substantial
burden on the exercise of the First Amendment right to use personal
funds for campaign speech” are reducing corruption or the
appearance of corruption.7 Although Justice Stevens, in a dissent
joined by Justice Souter, advocated abandoning the disparate
treatment of expenditure and contribution limits established by prior
precedent,8 the Court was not persuaded by the dissenting Justices’
reasoning and instead scrutinized the BCRA very closely because it
9
was “a limit on personal expenditures.”
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Congress passed the BCRA to limit the influence of wealth on
national elections.10 One element of the BCRA was the so-called
“Millionaire’s Amendment,” which increased the amount of
contributions a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives could
receive from individual donors when his opponent’s personal
11
expenditures exceeded a certain amount. The Millionaire’s
Amendment was enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Buckley v. Valeo, which upheld strict campaign contribution limits
but struck down similar limits on a candidate’s personal
expenditures.12
Under the Millionaire’s Amendment, when a candidate’s
expenditure of personal funds caused the “opposition personal funds
amount” (“OPFA”) to exceed $350,000, the opposing candidate could
receive individual contributions of $6,900, or three times the normal
13
limit of $2,300. The OPFA “is a statistic that compares the

7. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772–73 (holding that the burden the Millionaire’s Amendment
places on the self-financed candidate “is not justified by any governmental interest in
eliminating corruption or the perception of corruption” because the Court had previously held
that “reliance on personal funds reduces the threat of corruption”).
8. Id. at 2778 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 2772.
10. Davis v. FEC, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 25.
11. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a) (2006). There were also disclosure requirements for any
candidate who intended to spend personal funds in excess of $350,000 as well as disclosure
requirements once the candidate actually spent over $350,000 of his own funds. See §441a1(b)(1).
12. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51–54 (1976).
13. 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a)(1)(A)–(C).
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expenditure of personal funds by competing candidates and also takes
into account to some degree certain other fundraising.”14
Despite the requirements of the Millionaire’s Amendment, Jack
Davis relied on his personal wealth to finance two unsuccessful
15
Congressional campaigns in 2004 and 2006. Davis spent close to $1.2
million of his own funds in 2004 and $2.275 million of his own funds in
16
2006. Davis’s opponent spent no personal funds and did not receive
any contributions above the normal limits even though he was eligible
to receive an extra $1.5 million as a result of Davis’s personal
17
expenditures.
In June of 2006, Davis filed suit against the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) in District Court for the District of Columbia
arguing that the Millionaire’s Amendment should be held
unconstitutional on its face and that the FEC should be enjoined from
18
enforcing it during the 2006 election. Davis and the FEC both
moved for summary judgment, and the FEC’s motion was granted by
19
a three-judge panel in the District Court.
According to the District Court, to prove a First Amendment
violation, Davis needed to demonstrate that the Millionaire’s
Amendment burdened the exercise of political speech and that it was
20
not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The court
concluded that the Millionaire’s Amendment did not burden the
exercise of political speech because “[i]t place[d] no restrictions on a
candidate’s ability to spend unlimited amounts of his personal
21
wealth.” The increased contribution limits of the Millionaire’s
Amendment were “similar to statutes that permit higher contribution
limits for candidates who agree to public financing of their
campaigns.”22
Instead of restricting political speech, the court believed that the
Millionaire’s Amendment “correct[ed] a potential imbalance in
23
resources available to each candidate.” Also, the court dismissed
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2766.
Id. at 2767.
Id.
Id.
Id.; Davis v. FEC (Davis v. FEC), 501 F. Supp. 2d 22, 27 (D.D.C. 2007).
Davis v. FEC, 501 F. Supp. 2d. at 27.
Id. at 28 (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990)).
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id.
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Davis’s argument that the Millionaire’s Amendment chilled political
speech;24 the court noted that he spent well over $350,000 of his own
funds during each campaign, so it was clear his own speech was not
25
chilled. Finally, the District Court upheld the Millionaire’s
Amendment’s disclosure requirements26 because they did not “burden
[one’s] First Amendment right to participate freely in political
27
activities.”
The Supreme Court heard Davis’s appeal of the District Court
decision because the BCRA designates it as the exclusive avenue for
28
appellate review. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
District Court and held that the Millionaire’s Amendment violated
the First Amendment by burdening political speech in furtherance of
29
the impermissible goal of equalizing electoral opportunities.
III. HOLDING
Justice Alito delivered the majority opinion in the 5-4 decision.
The majority held that the increased contribution limits triggered
when the OPFA passed $350,000 were a burden on the self-financing
candidate because they discouraged personal expenditures by the
candidate.30 The Court reasoned that “[w]hile BCRA does not impose
a cap on a candidate’s expenditure of personal funds, it imposes an
unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly exercises that
First Amendment right.”31 Thus, the Millionaire’s Amendment
“impermissibly burdens [Davis’s] First Amendment right to spend his
32
own money for campaign speech.”

24. Id. at 31–32 (Davis argued that the Millionaire’s Amendment would chill personal
expenditures for candidates who “abhor” the corrupting influence of special interest
contributions because personal expenditures over $350,000 would increase the amount of
corrupting contributions the opposing candidate could receive.).
25. Id. at 32.
26. See 2 U.S.C. §441a-1(b)(1)(The disclosure requirements included: 1) Declaring how
much personal expenditures in excess of $350,000 the candidate plans on spending; 2) Notifying
the other candidate within 24 hours of spending $350,000 in personal funds and 3) Notifying the
other candidate within 24 hours of making every additional $10,000 in personal expenditures
over $350,000.).
27. Id. at 32.
28. See 2 U.S.C. § 403 (2006); 2 U.S.C. § 437h (2006) (establishing the procedures and
jurisdiction for judicial review on the constitutionality of the BRCA).
29. Davis v. FEC (Davis), 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2770 (2008).
30. See id. at 2771 (holding that some candidates would continue to make personal
expenditures over $350,000, but some would be discouraged by the Millionaire’s Amendment).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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The Court was eager to cast the holding as a consistent application
of the principles explicated in Buckley v. Valeo.33 In Buckley, the Court
struck down a cap on the personal funds a candidate could spend on
political speech, while upholding the ability of Congress to limit that
candidate’s expenditure of personal funds as a condition to accepting
public financing of his campaign.34 Like the cap on a candidate’s
personal expenditures in Buckley, the majority held that the
Millionaire’s Amendment imposed a “significant burden” on any
candidate who wished to exercise her First Amendment right to fund
35
campaign speech. Also, unlike the limit on personal expenditures
tied to a candidate’s acceptance of public financing that was upheld in
Buckley, the Millionaire’s Amendment “does not provide any way in
36
which a candidate can exercise that right without abridgment.”
Because the Court concluded that the Millionaire’s Amendment is
a “substantial burden” on a self-financing candidate’s First
Amendment right to use personal funds for campaign speech, “that
provision cannot stand unless it is ‘justified by a compelling state
37
interest.’” According to the Court, the only compelling interests that
can justify restrictions on campaign expenditures are the prevention
38
of corruption or the prevention of the appearance of corruption.
Applying the principles of Buckley, the Court held that “reliance on
personal funds reduces the threat of corruption, and therefore [the
Millionaire’s Amendment], by discouraging use of personal funds,
disserves the anticorruption interest.”39
Although the Government argued that the Millionaire’s
Amendment’s personal expenditure limit leveled electoral
opportunities by reducing potential disparity between candidates of
unequal personal wealth and thus served a compelling interest, the
Court rejected this as contrary to precedent expressly disavowing
Congress’s ability to restrict one candidate’s speech in order to
enhance another’s.40 Also, the Court held that recognizing leveling
33. See id. (Buckley established the “fundamental nature of the right to spend personal
funds for campaign speech”).
34. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (also holding that limits on expenditures, both
personal and total expenditures, were subject to heightened scrutiny compared to contribution
limits).
35. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772.
36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 256 (1986)).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2773.
40. Id.
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electoral opportunities as a compelling interest would have “ominous
implications because it would permit Congress to arrogate the voters’
authority to evaluate the strengths of candidates competing for
41
office.” Finally, the Government argued that the Millionaire’s
Amendment was justified because it “ameliorate[d] the deleterious
effects” of Buckley’s disparate treatment between contributions and
42
expenditures. But, because the Government did not argue that
Buckley’s treatment of contributions and expenditures should be
rejected, the Court said “it is hard to see how undoing the
consequences of that decision can be viewed as a compelling
interest.”43
Because the Millionaire’s Amendment’s expenditure limits were
held unconstitutional, its disclosure requirements were also held
unconstitutional because they “were designed to implement the
asymmetrical contribution limits provided for in” the Millionaire’s
Amendment.44
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justice Souter
joined in full, but which Justices Breyer and Ginsburg joined only to
the extent the dissent argued that the Millionaire’s Amendment was a
45
consistent application of Buckley’s principles. In Part I of Justice
Stevens’s dissent, he advocated rejecting Buckley’s treatment of
expenditure limits as direct restrictions on personal speech. Justice
Stevens argued that expenditure limits should instead be upheld as
long as they serve purposes that are legitimate and substantial.46
Furthermore, he offered two purposes that justify expenditure
limitations: (1) they free the candidate and staff from the burden of
fundraising and (2) they improve the quality of the exposition of ideas
47
by limiting the quantity but not the content of the speech.
In Part II of Justice Stevens’s dissent, which was joined by the
other three dissenters, he argued that, even within the framework of
Buckley, the Millionaire’s Amendment was “within the bounds of the

41. Id.
42. Id. at 2774.
43. Id. The Court did not address Davis’ claim that the Millionaire’s Amendment violated
the Equal Protection clause because the Millionaire’s Amendment was found unconstitutional
on other grounds. Id. at 2775.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2777 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
46. Id. at 2778 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 264 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
47. Id. at 2779.
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Constitution.”48 Unlike the majority, the dissent did not view the
Millionaire’s Amendment as a burden on a self-financing candidate,
but viewed it instead as a mechanism to increase the speech of a
49
candidate who is unable to spend mass amounts of personal wealth.
The dissent went on to state that even if the Millionaire’s Amendment
burdened the self-financing candidate’s First Amendment rights, “the
50
purposes of the [Millionaire’s] Amendment surely justify its effects.”
According to the dissent, the majority was wrong to assert that
eliminating corruption or the appearance of corruption were the only
51
reasons sufficient to restrict campaign expenditures. The dissent
argued that the Court “ha[s] long recognized the strength of an
independent governmental interest in reducing both the influence of
wealth on the outcomes of elections, and the appearance that wealth
alone dictates those results.”52 In support, the dissent pointed to cases
upholding restrictions on the amount of corporate funds that can be
53
contributed to political campaigns, and argued that there is no
reason the principles are “not equally applicable in the context of
individual wealth.”54 Thus, Justice Stevens argued, the Millionaire’s
Amendment is constitutional as a carefully crafted congressional
55
effort “motivated by proper and weighty goals.”
In a separate dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer,
endorsed the District Court’s “careful and persuasive opinion,” which
56
upheld the Millionaire’s Amendment. She broke from Justice
Stevens’s dissent and argued that because the FEC did not ask the
Court to overrule Buckley, she “would leave reconsideration of
Buckley for a later day.”57
IV. CONCLUSION
Among its many conclusions, the Court asserted that the only
compelling state interests that can justify a substantial burden on a

48. Id.
49. Id. at 2780.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2781.
53. Id. (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990); FEC v.
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2782 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 2782–83.
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candidate’s First Amendment rights are the prevention of corruption
or the prevention of the appearance of corruption.58 The dissent
vigorously disagreed and asserted that even assuming the
Millionaire’s Amendment burdened Davis’s political speech,
“[m]inimizing the effect of concentrated wealth on our political
process, and the concomitant interest in addressing the dangers that
attend the perception that political power can be purchased, are,
therefore, sufficiently weighty objectives to justify congressional
action.”59 The dissent supported its position with cases upholding
corporate contribution limits on the grounds that they reduced the
60
influence of corporate wealth and argued that McConnell v. FEC
supports the proposition that the influence of personal wealth is as
61
much a concern as the influence of corporate wealth.
Ultimately, the dissent’s argument fails for two reasons. First, the
dissent cited cases upholding corporate contribution limits to show
that limiting a wealthy candidate’s ability to use personal
expenditures to fund political speech is a compelling interest.
However, Buckley v. Valeo long ago established that expenditure and
contribution limits merit distinct treatment under the First
62
Amendment, so cases that limit corporate contributions do not
support limits on a self-financing candidate’s personal expenditures.
Corporate contribution limits can be constitutionally sanctioned
under Buckley because they limit corruption or the appearance of
corruption, whereas similar justification does not exist for limits on a
candidate’s personal expenditures. Second, McConnell was concerned
with “the pernicious influence of large campaign contributions,” so
the dissent is misguided to use McConnell to support their argument
that limiting the influence of individual wealth is a compelling
interest.63 The Millionaire’s Amendment was not related to corporate
contributions, but was a limit on personal expenditures, which are
scrutinized much more closely under Buckley.

58. Id. at 2772 (majority opinion).
59. Id. at 2781 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 2782.
61. See id. (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. 93, 116 (2003) (“Congress’ historical concern with
the ‘political potentialities of wealth’ and their ‘untoward consequences for the democratic
process’ . . . has long reached beyond corporate money.” (quoting United States v. Automobile
Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 577–78 (1957))).
62. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19–21 (1976).
63. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 117 (2003).
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The dissent firmly believed that the Millionaire’s Amendment was
not a burden at all, but rather that it simply amplified the voice of the
non-self-financing candidate,64 and argued that the Millionaire’s
Amendment actually promoted the First Amendment right to
65
political speech by “advancing its core principles.” It did this by
“[m]inimizing the effect of concentrated wealth on our political
process, and the concomitant interest in addressing the dangers that
attend the perception that political power can be purchased.”66 This is
a compelling point, and one which the majority vigorously attempted
to counter by responding that self-financing candidates are reluctant
to spend over $350,000 of their own funds because this triggers
increased contribution limits for their opponents.67
Furthermore, the dissent and majority agreed that the
Millionaire’s Amendment was a limit on personal expenditures,68 so
the majority felt forced—by Buckley’s strict treatment of personal
expenditure limits—to conclude that the Millionaire’s Amendment
was unconstitutional. This was because the Millionaire’s Amendment
did not limit corruption or the appearance of corruption, which are
the only two justifications the majority believed can support limits on
a candidate’s personal expenditures.
The majority’s reasoning was further bolstered because it was
likely that the increased contribution limits, designed by traditionally
non-self-financing incumbents, were intended to burden candidates
who choose to self-finance their campaigns. As long as a majority of
the Court accepts the proposition that schemes like the Millionaire’s
Amendment should be treated as expenditure limits, and Buckley’s
rigid treatment of expenditure limits survives, Congress will have

64. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2780.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2781.
67. See id. at 2772 (The Court acknowledges that a candidate is faced with a choice
between “[abiding] by a limit on personal expenditures or endur[ing] the burden that is placed
on that right” by the Millionaire’s Amendment. Also, by writing that “[m]any candidates who
can afford to make large personal expenditures to support their campaigns may choose to do so
despite 319(a),” the Court is implying that there are some candidates who will be deterred from
self-financing by the Millionaire’s Amendment.).
68. Id. at 2771 (“While [the Millionaire’s Amendment] does not impose a cap on a
candidate’s expenditure of personal funds, it imposes an unprecedented penalty on any
candidate who robustly exercises that First Amendment right.”); id. at 2779 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“If, as I have come to believe, Congress could attempt to reduce the millionaire
candidate’s advantage by imposing reasonable limits on all candidates’ expenditures, it follows a
fortiori that the eminently reasonable scheme before us today survives constitutional scrutiny.”).
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difficulty restricting the ability of wealthy candidate’s to self-finance
their campaigns.

